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This Report is a follow-up study on “How to create a transnational party 
system” (2010); it illustrates recent challenges and opportunities at EU
level concerning the emergence of: i) transnational parties and a
transnational party system; ii) constraints and opportunities for
representative democracy. The main areas addressed in the report are: 
(a) voting coherence of the EP Party Groups after the Euro-crisis; (b)
regulation of political parties at European level (PPELs); (c) role of 
political foundations at European level (PFELs). 
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. BACKGROUND AND AIMS
KEY FINDINGS
 
 This report is based on a follow-up study on “How to create a transnational party
system”. 
 It focuses: (a) the policy positions and coherence of the EP Party Groups after the 
Euro-crisis; (b) the regulation and funding of political parties at European level 
(PPELs); (c) the role of political foundations at European level (PFELs). 
 It ascertains the continued ability of EP Party Groups to respond cohesively to the 
challenges posed by the current economic crisis. 
 It further assesses the opportunities and incentives provided by EU legislation on
political parties at the EU level for the development of a transnational party system.
 Finally, it provides an assessment of the institutionalization of PFELs as 
organizations created for the promotion of democracy at EU level and for the 
support of their related PPELs. 
This report is based on a follow-up of the study “How to create a transnational party
system” commissioned by the European Parliament’s Constitutional Affairs Committee 
(AFCO) and conducted in 2010 by the Observatory on Political Parties and Representation 
(OPPR). The original study covered four aspects: 
1) An analysis of the political doctrine and programmes of major political parties in 
several Member States. 
2) An examination of current procedures applied to political parties with regard to how
they choose leaders for European Office. 
3) The development of proposals on how to help a European political party system 
evolve from national structures strongly influenced by historical traditions and 
cultural actors. 
4) Suggestions regarding the extent to which the European electoral system and 
different systems of party financing would have to be revised in order to facilitate 
the above objectives 
The follow-up updates, revises, and extends the original report. In particular, the updates
and revisions concern: 
1) The policy positions and coherence of the European Parliament (EP) Party Groups 
after the Euro-crisis; 
2) The regulation and funding of political parties at European level.
Furthermore, this report presents a first assessment of an aspect not directly touched upon 
in the original study, namely:
3) The role of political foundations at European level (PFELs). 
The discussion of transnational parties requires some semantic clarification. The official 
definition in regulation EC 2004/2003 is Political Parties at European level (PPELs). However 
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1.1.	 Policy Positions and Coherence of the EP Party Groups after 
the Euro-crisis 
How sparse and heterogeneous are the constituent member parties within the EP political
groups? To what extent are their policy positions different or similar? These were the main
research questions addressed in chapter I of the 2010 Report. A crucial normative
argument underlies the examination of policy positions of EP political groups: only
homogeneous political groups can pursue a coherent political agenda. If the groups are too
internally divided, they will fail to deliver what they promised to the European electorate
(through the national parties). It will be impossible for them to state an official policy
position and pursue it in the EP, to issue common declarations and, more importantly, to 
vote cohesively in the committees and in the plenary. Even more fundamentally, the 
ideological coherence of the political groups is prospectively of crucial importance for EU
democracy. It could certainly be argued (although with some reservations) that when (and
if) the national parties that have coalesced into the same EP political group express similar 
concerns and values, then common 'European' party cultures and even identities are
already in place. It is for this reason that the examination of policy positions is so
necessary. The 2010 report presented a moderately positive picture for the prospects of 
representative party democracy in the EU – at least as far as party coherence and 
differences are concerned. 
This report integrates and updates the analysis of the positions and level of coherence 
reached in the EP groups by focusing on the impact the economic and financial crisis has
had on possible differences generated within the Party Groups by the reactions of their 
different national components. This analytical choice is a result of the observation that the 
crisis appears to have increased the divergence between the creditor countries of Northern
Europe and the debtor countries of Southern Europe, wherein the former group is fairing 
comparatively well and the latter is experiencing a recession and suffering from record
levels of unemployment.
The analysis of whether the crisis and the crisis-related policies have had an impact on the 
policy coherence of the EP Party Groups relies on three different sources: Eurobarometer
(EB) data is used to map the attitudes of the electorate; a survey of Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) is used to assess attitudinal differences between Northern and 
Southern members within Party Groups; and roll-call voting data is used to assess the
existence of possible North-South divisions on key votes within the political groups in the
period following the crisis.
1.2.	 The Regulation and Funding of Political Parties at European
Level 
The increased regulation of political parties at national level throughout Europe has 
generally been justified as a measure to enhance the quality of democracy as it promotes
party organizational convergence and deters the emergence and institutionalization of anti-
system parties. Our 2010 report indeed confirmed the organizational convergence 
hypothesis, whereby parties that at national level operate within a common system of party 
financing tend to adapt their organizations in order to avail themselves of state funding. 
This evidence constitutes a good starting-point in favour of the argument that a strong  










































Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
therefore could help promote transnational convergence and hence transnational party-
building. In this regard we maintain that Regulations (EC) 2004/2003 and (EC) 1524/2007 
– which define the role of European political parties and the requirements needed for
parties to become eligible to receive funding from the EU – may well help consolidate more
effectively the various party components operating at the European level: political parties
at European level (PPELs), EP Groups and national parties.
However, the relationship between party finance rules and party building is not
unambiguous. Where parties have a long-standing organizational tradition, their primary 
interest is to maintain their structural articulation, by adapting to external changes, thus
producing financing schemes that are suited to their general goals and organizational 
needs. But depending on their organizational complexity, parties will still rely on other 
kinds of revenue as well. Such alternatives can produce convergence or divergence in
organizational models within different party systems. These differences notwithstanding, it
seems reasonable to assume that in transitional regimes or in non-stabilized party systems 
(like the EU), where non-institutionalized party organizations exist, party financing schemes 
will influence party-model convergence and party-building processes. 
This report updates the previous study and focuses more in depth on the problem of
organizational institutionalization by shifting the attention to a reform proposal recently
advanced by the Commission on the statute and funding of political parties at European
level (based on the Giannakou Report).  Its potential ability to overcome the shortcomings
of the existing regime based on Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 and its 2007 amendment 
(Regulation No 1524) is considered to be of particular relevance. More specifically, our
analysis combines party laws/regulations and funding regimes. With regard to the first
dimension, party regulation, we consider four variables: 1) the eventual procedures for
party registration; 2) the eventual provisions on party internal organization and party 
democracy; 3) the eventual provisions on party programmes; 4) the eventual provisions
regarding cases of termination of party activities. With regard to the second dimension, 
party funding, we analyse four more variables: 1) the presence of direct public funding; 2)
the presence of indirect public funding; 3) the eventual limits set on private funding; 4) the 
eventual limits placed on party expenditures. This analysis is integrated with further 
observations on the criteria for party eligibility to receive public funds and on provisions
regarding transparency and publicity. 
1.3.  The Role of Political Foundations at European Level 
The 2010 report did not consider the potential role of political foundations at European level 
(PFELs) given their development was still at best in its embryonic stage. Since Regulation
1524/2007 established PFELs as a tool to organize policy discussion within the EU, six years
have passed. In this time, they have been  organized as entities that are formally and
respectively affiliated to political parties at European level (PPELs), the objectives of which 
they are expected to support and underpin through their activities (Reg EC 1524/2007). By
creating the PFELs, the evident intent of the Regulation was to provide PPELs with an
additional instrument to help them perform their functions. 
This theoretical role has been also confirmed by the fact that over the last three years they 
have progressively increased their activities and made their presence felt (Gagatek and Van 
Hecke 2011). The inclusion of a section on PFELs in our follow-up report is therefore a
necessary complement to our original study, even if the topic was not originally part of the 
report. Clearly, we are still at a fact-finding stage on this topic and we seek to address the 
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1.	 What resources do PFELs have in terms of human and financial assets? (e.g., how
do budgets and human resources vary over the years?) 
2.	 What is the role of the PFELs? How do PFELs see themselves? (e.g., what are the 
aims officially expressed by the PFELs?) 
3.	 Since their formation, how have they interpreted their role? Through which activities 
do they perform their role? (e.g., the organization of conferences, seminars, youth 
and other annual events, summer schools, periodical or ad hoc publications etc.) 
4.	 In carrying out their activities do they act as single entities or as networks of
national or functional entities? Does this vary depending on the activities that are 
planned? Do they have a fixed central office or does this vary? 
5.	 What are their relations with their affiliated PPELs? (e.g., do they often perform 
activities jointly with their PPEL? Is there overlapping personnel between the two?) 
6.	 What are their relations with their affiliated national political foundations? (e.g., do 
they limit their activities to the European Union or do they also have relations with
organisations from extra-EU countries?)
7.	 How do they perform their political education function? (e.g., do they increase their
activities during the electoral campaigns – short-term perspective – or do they
perform initiatives independently of elections and special events?) 
To answer these questions we analyse primary resources and complement them with data 



















   
 















Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
2. POLICY POSITIONS AND COHERENCE OF THE EP PARTY 
GROUPS AFTER THE EURO-CRISIS
 With regard to EU democracy, homogeneous political groups are crucial in providing 
European voters with a meaningful programmatic supply. 
 Despite the fact that the impact of the 2007 ‘mega-enlargement’ has been limited, 
the recent economic crisis may have endangered cohesion and the policy agenda of
the Political Groups, resulting in a new territorial divide between Northern and 
Southern MEPs.
 However, the analysis of the preferences of both the ‘party in the electorate’ and the
‘party in public office’ unexpectedly revealed that differences between the Northern 
and the Southern members of the EP Party Groups remain small and have not
grown after the crisis. 
 Similarly, a territorial split within the Party Groups was not observed in the analysis
of MEP voting behaviour, leading to optimistic conclusions about the EU party
system’s political development in spite of the economic crisis.
KEY FINDINGS
 
This chapter builds on the first chapter of the report, “How to Create a Transnational Party 
System” (Bardi et al., 2010), which looked at the positions and coherence of the EP Party 
Groups after the Eastern enlargement. Our aim, in light of the current economic and
financial crisis of the European Union (EU), is to update it. To pursue this objective, we take
a much narrower focus, concentrating selectively on the position of the national member 
parties of the EP Party Groups on crisis-related policies, such as the economic governance
of the EU or the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the Euro. 
The rationale underlying this analytical focus is easy to explain. The economic and financial 
crisis of the EU and the new ‘politics of austerity’ (Streeck and Schafer, 2013) that
accompany it are deemed responsible for having produced new tensions or exacerbated old 
ones in the EU. In particular, the crisis appears to have increased the divergence between 
the creditor countries of Northern Europe and the debtor countries of Southern Europe. 
Indeed, while the economies of the countries in the former group are doing comparatively
well, those of the countries in the latter group are suffering from record levels of
unemployment and have entered a severe recession. 
Hence, the question asked in this chapter is whether the crisis and the crisis-related policies
have had an impact on the policy coherence of the EP Party Groups. Fundamentally, what 
interests us more here is whether – after the crisis – the Northern and the Southern 
member parties of the EP Party Groups have developed significantly different positions on
such key economic policies pursued by the EU as the common currency or its new economic 
governance. While the scholarly literature on the policy coherence of the EP Party Group 
following the enlargement has demonstrated that the expansion to incorporate Central and 
Eastern Europe did not have a negative impact – also a key finding of the previous report
(Bardi et al., 2010, pp. 29-31) – the economic and financial crisis is likely to represent a
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Different data is used to study the range of positions represented within the EP Party 
Groups. Using the recently released Eurobarometer (EB) data, we map the attitudes of the 
‘party in the electorate’.2 On the basis of a survey of MEPs, we look for attitudinal 
differences between Northern and Southern members in the ‘party in public office’. Finally,
in an analysis of voting behaviour with regard to several key anti-crisis measures in which
the EP was co-legislator – specifically, the ‘Two-Pack’ and the ‘Six-Pack’ – we are able to
evaluate if there is evidence for a North-South division within the political groups in the 
post-crisis period. The unambiguous conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that the 
crisis, for the time being at least, has not led to disruptions in the coherence of the EP Party 
Groups. In other words, the coherence of the EP Party Groups has not been undermined.  
2.1. The Economic and Financial Crisis and the EP Party Groups
It is generally argued that the coherence of the groups is a function of cross-cutting  
economic and social cleavages in the EU (Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999; Bardi et al.
2010): the more the cleavages cut across the national borders of the EU Member States,
the stronger the coherence of the transnational groups. In other words, parties should have 
more in common with other parties from the same party family, than with other parties
from the same member country. For example, two Socialist parties should have more in
common than two French parties. When this is not the case – that is, when inter-party 
differences coincide with the national borders of the EU Member States – the idea of
coherent transnational parties is fundamentally called into question. 
As the EU expanded eastward, it was feared that parties from the post-communist region 
would not “fit” neatly within the West European party families, whereby the territorial
division (in this case, West-East divisions) would manifest alongside ideological (left-right)
divisions. Yet, research has convincingly demonstrated that the cleavage between the old
and new members of the EU failed to materialize (see Section 3 below). Would the recent
economic and financial crisis, then, represent a more substantial challenge for the 
coherence of the groups? 
Indeed, the economic and financial crisis introduced a new territorial divide within the pool 
of old members, separating the surplus countries in Northern Europe from the deficit
countries in Southern Europe. The economic cleavage between the North and the South of 
Europe became more and more dramatic as the crisis unfolded. Taxpayers in the former 
countries were asked to provide money to bail-out the insolvent countries of Mediterranean
Europe (and Ireland) and, in return, they required that the latter implement strict austerity 
policies, cut public spending, run a balanced budget and implement structural reforms. The 
short-term consequences of austerity for the Member States in the South were high 
interest rates, growing unemployment rates and, more generally, the onset of economic 
recession. Consequently, the economic and financial crisis might have produced, or
accentuated, a deepening of the differences between the Northern and the Southern 
members of the Union. 
What would be the relevance of this argument for the EP Party Groups? If the crisis 
rendered more salient the territorial divide between Northern and Southern members, there 
would be substantial implications for party coherence. It might be expected that members
2 This chapter does not adhere to Katz and Mair’s now classic distinction between the “party in central office”, the
“party in public office” and the “party on the ground” (Katz and Mair, 1993). When applied to Europarties, the 
“party on the ground” is generally used to refer to the national member parties (Bardi et al., 2010). In this 
chapter, as our goal is to map attitudes at the level of the (national) party electoral base of support, we have 






























Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
from the same geographical area (e.g. Southern Europe) would have more similar 
preferences with regard to socio-economic policies or the governance of the EU than with 
other members of the same ‘party family’. In other words, the ideological coherence 
between members would be blurred by this new territorial divide.
2.2. State of the Art: the EP Party Groups after EU Enlargement 
At the time the first report (Bardi et al. 2010) was written, the key issue for the EU and for 
the ideological coherence of its EP Party Groups was the assessment of the impact of
enlargement. The intake of a large number of new members between 2004 and 2007 raised 
concerns over whether the Party Groups would successfully be able to absorb them. There 
were legitimate preoccupations that the new groups constituted in July 2009 would not be 
‘United in Diversity’ – to borrow the words of the EU motto – and that too much internal
diversity would undermine their capacity to act cohesively. In Chapter 1 of the report, we
assessed empirically the consequences of enlargement through an analysis of both the 
Euromanifestos and EU Profiler data. Our conclusion was unambiguous and, to some 
extent, counter-intuitive. In the report, we stated: the ‘impact [of enlargement] on the 
cohesion and the policy agenda of the political groups has been moderate. CEE parties have 
some distinct priorities (especially in foreign and in economic policies) but, overall, they are
far from constituting a separate sub-group’ (Bardi et al. 2010, p. 30).  
From 2009 onwards, other studies that mapped the position of the Party Groups also 
focused on their internal diversity. Although they shared similar expectations that the 
inclusion of the new members would prove disruptive, and despite the different data that 
was compiled and used to make the analysis, the results of these studies all support the 
claim that the enlargement has not undermined the coherence of the Party Groups. In fact, 
academics have written that ‘surprisingly enough, the EU party system has not changed 
much as a result of Eastern enlargement’ (Schmitt and Thomassen 2009, p. 582); that ‘no 
evidence [was found] that enlargement has affected the overall ideological structure or that 
it has weakened partisan divisions’ (Voeten 2009, p. 94); that ‘even given the 
extraordinary diversity among of the national political systems of the newly expanded EU …
we find a convergence in the structure of political contestation between the national and 
the European arenas’ (McElroy and Benoit 2010, p. 396); and that ‘party cohesion [has] 
remained stable despite the 2004 enlargement' (Hix and Noury 2009 p. 162). That this 
conclusion is very robust, insofar as it is based on the analyses of different data such as
texts (party manifestos), attitudinal surveys of MEPs, expert surveys, and roll-call votes in
the EP, is particularly significant.
Yet, the enlarged groups vary in their level of coherence. Obviously, a broader range of
positions is found within the larger Party Groups – which bring together parties from
several, if not all, of the 28 EU-member countries, and often include more than one party 
per member country. In our report, the data revealed that this was particularly the case for 
the ALDE Group, whose members had quite a diverse range of positions on left-right 
policies (Bardi et al. 2010, p. 30). In a later study that used expert surveys to analyse the
policy development of the Party Groups, it was also found that the ‘ALDE has the widest 
range of positions among its member parties’ (McElroy and Benoit 2012, p. 162).  
Interestingly, analyses on voting behaviour reveal that the (then) new members from 
Central and Eastern Europe do not tend to defect more from their EP Party Group than old 
members. In an early study of voting behaviour in the Sixth EP, Coman (2009, p. 1112) 
argued that they are actually less likely to go against their group plurality, insofar as they 
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MEPs. A similar perspective is shared by Lindstaedt et al. (2012), who, in their observations 
of more defections from the new members in an early phase of the legislature, make the 
contention that as new members adapt over time to the norms of the parliamentary
assembly differences in voting behaviour among newer and incumbent MEPs disappear.
However, a study on the organizational adaptation of the political groups to enlargement 
demonstrates that the high levels of voting cohesion of the enlarged groups should not
come as a surprise (Bressanelli, 2014). As the intake of a large number of new members 
and delegations was likely to endanger cohesion, the group leaderships strengthened the
group organizations and introduced new institutional mechanisms to forge consensus and
strengthen intra-party agreement. 
Unfortunately, just as the evidence had been gathered to demonstrate that enlargement
was much less problematic than was expected ex ante, the economic and financial crisis hit
the EU and its member countries. When Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy in
September 2008, few would have predicted that what first appeared to be a subprime 
mortgage crisis would later become an economic crisis of unprecedented magnitude in the
post-World War II era. Shortly after the EU and its EP Party Groups had absorbed into their 
ranks the new member countries and parties, new questions and issues emerged on the EU
agenda, providing a new challenge for the EU and its parties. In the section that follows, we
provide a preliminary empirical assessment of the cohesion of the EP groups after the 
outbreak of the crisis. 
2.3. The ‘Party in the Electorate’ and the Crisis 
To assess whether the Party Groups became internally divided along territorial lines
following the Euro-crisis, we look first at the attitudes of their supporters towards the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Attitudes towards the EMU and the single currency
are likely to be shaped by the perceptions that citizens have of the economic situation and 
the role the EU has played. It is thus reasonable to expect some variation to have occurred
in attitudes towards the EMU in the different regions of Europe according to how these were 
affected by the crisis. We capture the attitudes of the citizens using Eurobarometer (EB)
survey data, operationalizing the ‘party in the electorate’ by aggregating individual answers
first by national party and then by political group in the EP. To pursue this task, we take
advantage of the questions asked by EB 69.2 (March-May 2008) and EB 71.1 (January-
February 2009) on ‘party attachment’3, and EB 71.3 (June-July 2009) on ‘EP election 
vote?’.4 Using these new data, which have been recently released to the public by the EC5, 
we are able to describe the attitudes of party supporters approximately one year after the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and to present a before and after comparison of the ‘party 
in the electorate’ with regard to the crisis. In this way, we are able to gauge if attitudes in
the base of support of the EP Party Groups changed after the crisis (if not specifically
because of the crisis).6 
We start our analysis by comparing the attitudes towards the EMU among party supporters 
in Northern and Southern Europe. Operationally, we have included Belgium, Germany, 
France, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden in the former group, and 
Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain in the latter. We use EB 71.3, 
which asked the EU citizens their opinion on ‘A European Monetary Union with a single
3 EB 69.2 D2 and EB 71.1 Q A26 ‘Party Attachment’
 
4 EB 71.3 Q K2 ‘European Election Vote’
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contained in both surveys concerning the economic role of the EU in regulatory, budgetary
and financial questions, for which the respondent was asked to answer using the classic 
five-point-scale10 were considered. The choice of the data is straightforward: every
comparable question (namely, those with the same formulation for both surveys) that
pertained to any economic issue was included. If the crisis has endangered the unity of
Party Groups along a new territorial cleavage, we would expect significant differences
between Northern and Southern members of each Party Group to have appeared. Table 2
shows the mean value of the MEP answers – aggregated by Party Group and differentiated
between Northern and Southern ‘delegations’ – and the difference between these two 
components before and after the crisis. Due to the relatively small sample and the limited 
presence of some Party Groups in certain geographical areas, only the three main groups
(EPP, S&D and ALDE) are analysed. 
Figure 2.5: MEP attitudes on economic issues before (2006) and after the crisis
(2010) 
Q1. reg_labour Q5. budg_development Q9. budg_cohesion 
Year 2006 2010 2006 2010 2006 2010 
N S Diff. N S Diff. N S Diff. N S Diff. N S Diff. N S Diff. 
EPP 3,29 2,50 0,79 2,53 2,35 0,18 2,76 2,70 0,06 2,47 2,06 0,41 2,92 2,60 0,32 2,59 2,21 0,37 
S&D 1,78 1,58 0,19 1,57 1,84 0,27 2,00 1,58 0,42 2,14 2,16 0,02 1,89 1,17 0,72 2,00 1,68 0,32 
ALDE 3,29 2,33 0,95 2,71 2,25 0,46 2,36 1,67 0,69 2,29 2,00 0,29 2,92 1,83 1,09 2,57 2,25 0,32 
Q2. reg_EU_taxes Q6. budg_unemployment Q10. emu_inflation 
Year 2006 2010 2006 2010 2006 2010 
N S Diff. N S Diff. N S Diff. N S Diff. N S Diff. N S Diff. 
EPP 2,33 3,40 1,07 3,12 2,63 0,49 4,18 3,00 1,18 3,35 2,07 1,29 4,23 3,56 0,67 3,76 2,80 0,96 
S&D 1,83 2,09 0,26 1,71 1,95 0,23 2,28 1,70 0,58 2,71 2,05 0,66 2,59 3,00 0,41 3,07 2,95 0,12 
ALDE 3,21 2,67 0,55 2,71 2,75 0,04 3,83 2,83 1,00 2,86 2,50 0,36 3,33 3,33 0,00 3,50 2,75 0,75 
Q3. reg_environment Q7. budg_agriculture Q11. emu_deficit 
Year 2006 2010 2006 2010 2006 2010 
N S Diff. N S Diff. N S Diff. N S Diff. N S Diff. N S Diff. 
EPP 2,92 2,40 0,52 2,35 2,00 0,35 4,13 4,30 0,18 2,94 2,44 0,50 4,55 3,67 0,88 3,53 3,00 0,53 
S&D 1,89 1,33 0,56 1,57 1,79 0,22 4,42 4,17 0,25 3,71 3,26 0,45 2,76 2,89 0,12 3,21 3,16 0,06 
ALDE 2,14 1,67 0,48 1,71 2,25 0,54 4,36 4,17 0,19 4,00 3,25 0,75 4,00 3,83 0,17 4,50 3,00 1,50 
Q4. reg_food Q8. budg_r&d Q12. emu_ecb 
Year 2006 2010 2006 2010 2006 2010 
N S Diff. N S Diff. N S Diff. N S Diff. N S Diff. N S Diff. 
EPP 2,79 2,30 0,49 2,47 2,00 0,47 1,32 1,60 0,28 1,65 1,63 0,02 3,18 3,00 0,18 3,06 3,00 0,06 
S&D 2,00 1,50 0,50 1,79 1,95 0,16 1,33 1,17 0,17 1,57 1,47 0,10 3,63 3,56 0,07 2,93 3,11 0,18 
ALDE 2,43 1,50 0,93 2,29 1,75 0,54 1,36 1,00 0,36 1,43 1,75 0,32 3,33 3,60 0,27 2,67 3,00 0,33 
Source: elaboration from EPRG 2006 and 2010 surveys 
The results provide a rather reassuring picture in terms of Party Group cohesion. First,
some differences between Northern and Southern members of the same Party Group
already existed in the pre-crisis period. For instance, Northern MEPs – of all groups – were
less favourable of the greater regulation of labour rights at the European level (Q1) than
their Southern colleagues; similarly, Northern MEPs thought that a smaller share of the EU
budget should be allocated to cohesion policies (Q9) in comparison to their Southern
10 For the questions on regulation and EU budget, the scale corresponds to a lot more / more / about the same /
less / a lot less; for the last two questions on the role of the EMU, the respondent is asked to grade his level of
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colleagues. The major differences, however, remain between Party Groups rather than 
between Northern and Southern members of the same Party Group: for instance, the EPP 
and the ALDE – from both geographical areas – in 2006 were less supportive of the 
allocation of a quota of the EU budget to unemployment aids (Q6), while members of the
Socialist group (later S&D) were considerably more in favour of such a measure. 
Yet, were North-South differences exacerbated by the economic crisis? Surprisingly, not
only is this not the case, but rather an opposite trend clearly emerges from the data. 
Differences between Northern and Southern members of the EP Party Groups not only
remain small, but in the majority of cases tend to decrease (the highlighted cells in Table 
2): In other words, the Party Groups seem to have become more internally coherent after 
the crisis than they were before the crisis (with the sole exception of Q7 on agricultural
policy, where all Party Groups are – albeit marginally – more divided). Overall, the results 
are sufficiently clear to make the assertion that, a new territorial cleavage between
Northern and Southern Europe did not emerge after the first year of the crisis, and this
applies not only to the ‘party in the electorate’, but also to the party in ‘public office’. 
2.4.2. Evidence from roll-call votes 
A final assessment of the manner in which the crisis affected the EP Party Groups can be 
made by looking at MEP voting behaviour. While the previous sections examined the
preferences of party supporters and legislators, this section assesses whether differences 
between Southern and Northern Europe can be found in MEP voting behaviour on several 
key anti-crisis measures.
This endeavour, it has to be noted, is more difficult than the previous one for two reasons. 
The first is structural: the EP has had a more limited role in the EU’s response to the 
financial and economic crisis, which has been characterized by the prominent role of the 
European Council. Furthermore, a number of anti-crisis instruments – such as the European 
Semester, the Euro Plus Pact and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in
the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), which includes a fiscal section known as the 
‘Fiscal Compact’ – were adopted outside the EU framework in order to overcome political
and legal hurdles and to speed up negotiations. In some cases, however, the EP was more 
actively involved. For instance, the reformed rules introduced in the Six Pack (which came
into force in December 2011) and the Two Pack (which entered into force in May 2013) –
both grounded in the European Semester, the EU's economic policy-making cycle – has
seen the EP designated the crucial role of co-legislator alongside the Council (Poptcheva, 
2012). 
The second reason is methodological: our analysis of voting behaviour is based on ‘roll-call 
votes’, namely those votes for which there is a public record of the position taken by each 
MEP that actually voted (yes, no, abstain), those instances in which the MEP was absent, 
and those in which the MEP was present but did not actually vote. These votes, however,
do not represent the entirety of the votes cast: in the case of the EP, they correspond to
roughly one third of all votes. Moreover, since this subset is not representative of the 
complete population of votes, any inference based on this sample may be biased, especially
if – as has been noted by several scholars (i.e. Carrubba and Gabel 1999; Hug 2006; 
Carrubba et al. 2008) – the object under scrutiny, such as political group cohesion, is
associated with the reason for which Party Groups call for a roll-call vote11. 
11 Only final legislative votes, as was established in 2009 by the EP, must necessarily be roll-call votes. For all 
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Despite these two elements, it is still reasonable to suggest that the crisis may have
shaped voting behaviour. To analyse this, we look at roll-call votes on nine key anti-crisis 
measures that were voted in the seventh EP. The analysis comprises the final vote on the 
topic as well as the previous votes on the various amendments and related dossiers, where
these were available; therefore, each measure may correspond to more than one voting 
session. On the whole, the dataset created consists of 39 different voting sessions12, which 
correspond to 29,328 individual MEP votes. Placed in chronological order, the nine key
measures selected for our investigation are the following: the creation of a European Bank 
Authority (September 2010); a general document on measures and initiatives to mitigate 
the financial, economic and social crisis underway (July 2011); the ‘Six-pack’, a set 
measures to reform the Stability and Growth Pact and to introduce new macroeconomic
surveillance at the European level (September 2011); the possibility to create government 
bonds issued in Euros jointly by the 17 Eurozone countries, usually referred to as 
‘Eurobonds’ (February 2012); the creation of a European financial transaction tax, or FTT
(May 2012); the further refinement of the criteria to monitor the excessive deficits and 
difficulties of Member States with respect to their financial stability, generally called ‘Two­
pack’ (June 2012 and March 2013); the latest approved multi-annual financial framework 
(March 2013); and lastly, the implementation of the FTT (July 2013). 
In the analysis, we classified MEPs as ‘Northern’, ‘Southern’ and ‘rest of the EU’, according 
to the same criterion used in the previous sections. Then, we calculated the voting cohesion
for each of the 39 votes by broad geographical area. In this way, it was possible to observe 
the likelihood all of the MEPs from each of these areas, regardless of the political group 
they belong to, would vote together. This original calculation – grouping MEPs not 
according to their country or Party Group, as the literature usually does (Hix et al. 2007), 
but by their broad geographical area – provides a more specific indication of the validity of
the argument that MEPs that belong to the same area (Northern or Southern) behave 
similarly. Finally, it is to be noted that a meaningful ‘before-after’ crisis comparison is not
possible here, for the obvious fact that we are looking specifically at anti-crisis measures.
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Figure 2.6: Voting cohesion of Northern, Southern and other MEPs 
Source: elaboration from VoteWatch, 2014 
The average cohesion of Northern and Southern MEPs is fairly high and similar (64 and 62 
per cent). This result is particularly meaningful if we consider that these legislators belong
to different, often opposing, political traditions – from Communists to Eurosceptics – and
that they voted on controversial economic dossiers, on which Party Groups in general tend
to be less cohesive. The comparison between the score of these two groups with the rest of
MEPs further corroborates the idea that Northern and Southern members have a 
comparatively high voting cohesion. In fact, the average cohesion of this third group is
significantly lower (42 per cent). Graph 5 displays these results for each of the 39 votes: 
the closer the line to the centre of the radar graph, the lower the cohesion; conversely, the 
closer the line to the circumference, the higher the cohesion. Northern members (blue line)
are always more cohesive than MEPs in the rest of the EU (green line), as is the case with 
Southern MEPs (red line) with the exception of the three votes on the ‘Six-Pack’ (2161, 
2162, 2163) and in the first vote on the ‘Two-pack’ (2952). The general pattern, however, 
is evident: Northern and Southern groups of MEPs show significantly higher cohesion scores
than the other MEPs. This is especially clear in the upper left part of the graph, for the 
votes between 3714 and 4374, i.e., the second round of votes on the ‘Two-pack’ in 2013, 
the multi-annual financial framework and the implementation of the Financial Tax
Transaction. 
There are two possible explanations for these results: either Northern MEPs tend to vote,
for example, ‘yes’ to votes where Southern MEPs tend to vote ‘no’ (so both have a high
internal cohesion, but vote differently), wherein the rest of the Parliament is split between
the two options, or Northern and Southern MEPs tend to vote similarly, and the rest of the 
MEPs vote less cohesively. To assess which of the two is the correct explanation it is 
sufficient to check  how the simple majority of MEPs in each ‘zone’  voted. Counter-
intuitively, thus disproving once more the argument of the emergence of a new territorial
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coincide, while in eight instances the majority of MEPs from other countries voted in the
opposite direction.13 In other words, not once were Northern and Southern MEPs part of
two opposing ‘coalitions’ that fought over some legislation voting respectively ‘yes’ and ‘no’, 
or vice-versa. Even with regard to several crucial anti-crisis measures, a re-territorialization
of voting behaviour has not emerged: as a matter of fact, Northern and Southern MEPs 
have always voted cohesively, and the rest of the MEPs are those who have diverged from
this common position. 
2.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has analysed the positions and the coherence of the EP Party Groups on key 
economic issues that arose after the economic and financial crisis that hit the EU in 2008.
We speculated that the crisis was likely to trigger territorial divides within the Party Groups, 
particularly between their Northern and Southern members. Because of the different
macro-economic and financial perspectives of the North and South, we hypothesized that 
these differences would be mirrored within the Party Groups. Building on the argument that
transnational parties, and a transnational party system, need to be based on socio­
economic cleavages that cut across the national borders of the EU Member States (Schmitt
and Thomassen, 1999; Bardi et al., 2010), we argued that the crisis, in as far as it may
have increased regional differences within the groups, might have endangered the policy
coherence of the groups themselves. 
We assessed this argument by looking at the ‘party in the electorate’ (the party supporters)
and the ‘party in public office’ (MEPs). Based on our analysis of data extracted from the 
Eurobarometer surveys, the EPRG survey of MEPs and roll-call votes, we reached the  
unexpected conclusion that attitudinal and behavioural differences between the Northern
and the Southern members of the EP Party Groups remain small and have not grown after 
the crisis. In short, a territorial split between Northern and Southern members has not 
been observed within the Party Groups. Obviously, this does not rule out the possibility that 
in the electorate at large, and beyond the major Party Groups, stronger differences 
between the two regions could be traced. Additionally, as the survey data that we used 
here refer to an early phase of the crisis (2009-10), its dramatic social effects may not yet 
have fully manifested. Still, even if these last remarks suggest that some caution should be 
used in the interpretation of our findings, we regard them as encouraging indicators with 
regard to the prospects of the development of truly transnational EP Party Groups.
13 This is mainly due to English MEPs from ECR and EPP, who are the most inclined to deviate from the party line
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3. THE REGULATION AND FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
AT EUROPEAN LEVEL 
 Party rules and regulations have a tendency to promote organizational convergence:
this is particularly valid for non-stabilized party systems, such as the EU, where
non-institutionalized party organizations exist.
 EU institutions have progressively opted for a more detailed and defined codification
of the nature, role and activities of PPELs in the wake of the existing national
practices 
 The adoption of a common European statute for all PPELs, based on EU law and 
defining a common legal, organizational and financial status is a fundamental 
precondition for the creation of a European polis and a common political space. 
 The Giannakou Report and the Commission's proposal represent institutional efforts 
to strengthen the transnational nature of the PPELs and to create deeper ties
between them and EU citizens. However, the final regulation adopted seems less 
keen to promote an effective autonomisation of PPELs. 
KEY FINDINGS
 
The regulation of political parties has become a widespread phenomenon throughout 
Europe. The introduction of party regulation has generally been interpreted as a measure to
enhance the quality of democracy. In fact, the need to conform to a set of shared norms 
and requisites in order to acquire legal status and gain access to public resources (or other 
kinds of benefits) should favour organizational convergence and deter the emergence and 
institutionalization of anti-system parties. Insofar as rules and regulations have a tendency
to promote organizational convergence among actors that operate within a common
functional field, parties will tend to adapt their organizational profile to avail themselves of
environmental resources14. This is particularly true in transitional regimes or in non-
stabilized party systems, such as the EU, where non-institutionalized party organizations 
exist. 
In Europe, the (eventual) formal codification of parties at the national level has followed
different paths, due to the timing and patterns of national democratization processes15. 
However, the discipline of party activities and their internal organizations has primarily
occurred alongside the introduction of public funding regimes, which must be supported by 
defined settings of norms and procedures16. Scholars and practitioners argue that party 
regulation and funding reflect and affect a modification in the very nature of political
parties, as their formal recognition – through constitutional codification, state subventions 
and party laws – transformed their profiles and roles from private associations into peculiar 
forms of public utilities17. This transformation has been interpreted as the by-product of a 
progressive separation between political parties and civil society and the concomitant 
penetration of parties into the state18. No longer the representatives of specific societal
pillars or cleavages, parties have become semi-state agencies in charge of producing public
14 Pizzimenti, Bardi forthcoming. 

15 Van Biezen, Borz 2012.
 
16 See Van Biezen 2008; Van Biezen, Rashkova 2012.
 
17 See Van Biezen 2004; 2008; Pizzimenti 2012.
 

























                                                 
   
   
  
 
   
  
  
    
  
 
Political Parties and Political Foundations at European Level. Challenges and Opportunities 
goods in their role of decision and policy makers. As the level of public confidence in
political parties steadily decreased, the introduction of stricter systems of controls of their 
performances and behaviour was the other side of the coin for the introduction of state 
subventions.
The existence of party regulation can thus be conceived as a reliable indicator of a
normative modification in the relationships between the state, civil society and political
parties19. However, as has emerged in the specialized literature, depending on what the 
logic underlying regulations and laws is, the effects on the party-building process and the
consolidation of the party system may not be univocal. In fact, while state subventions 
have proved effective in helping party structuring, other aspects of party regulation may, at
the same time, hinder this process. This is particularly true with regard to the limits set for 
donations and contributions from private actors20. More specifically, the existence of a 
regulatory framework, per se, does not represent a guarantee for the creation and
stabilization of party organizations and party systems. Depending on the kind of 
prescriptions set forth in the regulations and, in particular, on the existing balance between
private revenues and State subventions, the final outcome could differ greatly from case to 
case. 
3.1. Party Regulation and Party Funding in the European Countries 
3.1.1. A framework for the analysis of party regulation and funding
The specialized literature on party regulation and party funding has not yet come to 
delineate a comprehensive and widely accepted analytical framework aimed at formulating
cross-national generalizations. Many studies have focused on single or regional cases, but 
only a few make explicit attempts to formulate specific hypotheses on the existing
relationships between party organizational change and state regulation/funding21. As 
reported in a recent comparative study by Piccio22, 18 of 28 EU member states have passed 
a party law: in 23 cases, parties are mentioned or regulated in the national Constitution, 
while 20 countries have adopted financial laws23 (see Tab. 1). Although the author
maintains that this widespread phenomenon may also be explained as the result of the
normative pressures that arise from unspecified European governmental and non­
governmental organizations  – while it seems more likely that this is the result of the 
opposite tendency, as we will see in the following section – variance in the regulatory
frameworks is significant.
19 Bardi et al. 2010.
20 As Booth and Robbins maintain (2010: 634): “in a scenario where there are limits on contributions by private 
interests, there is a decrease in the cultivation of societal bonds thereby undermining party system
institutionalization [...]”.
21 See Katz, Mair 1995; Scarrow 2006; Van Biezen, Kopecky 2007; Van Biezen 2008; Booth, Robbins 2010; Koss 
2011; Van Biezen, Rashkowa 2012.
22 See Piccio, D. R. (2012). Party Regulation in Europe: Country Reports. Working Paper Series on the Legal 
Regulation of Political Parties, No. 18. Paper available at: http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/uploads/wp1812.pdf   
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scheme of the various types of party financing in Europe: the different relevance that each 
type of funding (direct and indirect public funding; plutocratic funding, grass-roots
revenues) assumes for different parties was considered to further facilitate our 
understanding of party organizational development.
In what follows we try to combine funding regimes and party laws/regulations, insofar as 
they may be considered two sides of the same coin, namely the level of state intervention
in party politics. With regard to the first dimension, i.e. party regulation, we consider the
constitutionalization of political parties and the presence/absence of specific laws that 
regulate political parties. In particular, we will concentrate on the following variables: 1)
the eventual procedures for party registration; 2) the eventual provisions on party internal 
organization and party democracy; 3) the eventual provisions on party programmes; 4) the 
eventual provisions regarding cases of termination of party activities.
With regard to the second dimension, namely party funding, we will analyse these
variables: 1) the presence of direct public funding; 2) the presence of indirect public
funding; 3) the eventual limits set on private funding; 4) the eventual limits placed on 
party expenditures. We will integrate this analysis with further observations on the criteria
pertaining to party eligibility to receive public funds and the provisions on transparency and 
publicity.
We then proceed with a descriptive cross-national analysis based on the variables selected
using the two aforementioned dimensions. We make reference to our 2010 analysis, and 
integrate information and data collected and published within the framework of the IDEA
project25 and the project, “Party Law in Modern Europe”26. 
3.1.2. Party Regulation 
Party registration
Party registration is compulsory in 18 countries, in particular in those where a liberal-
democratic regime has been established in the last 30 years – with the relevant exceptions 
of the UK, where the registration is not compulsory but is instrumental to access public
facilities, and Ireland. The registration is, in general, a formal recognition of the legal entity
and the democratic foundations of the applying parties. It is usually requested that a 
minimum number of signatures, of citizens or party members (for example in Bulgaria,
Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands etc.), be submitted to the
public authority (depending on the case, the Interior Ministry, the Judicial Court, a specific
tribunal) as well as specific documentation (such as the party statute, the legal
representative of the party, the legal address of its headquarters etc.).
Party organization
Specific provisions on the internal organization of political parties have been established in
16 countries. In this case, the “geography” of the regulation is slightly different when
compared to party registration. German party law is very detailed in this respect, and all
Central and Eastern European countries – as well as Spain, Portugal and Finland – have
passed state regulations regarding the organizational aspects such as the contents of the
party charter/statute (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia); party membership 
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Spain), the composition and powers of internal bodies (Germany, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia); the frequency of the meetings of the party organs
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Party programmes
Party political programmes are, in most cases, requested by the public authority as a 
compulsory document to be attached to the registration form and are intended as a means 
to demonstrate the adherence of the party to democratic principles. However, in countries 
like Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden, where party registration is compulsory, parties 
are not obliged to present their political programmes. While this is also true for the UK, the
opposite occurs in Germany.
Termination of party activities
The cessation or termination of party activities, as a consequence of a normative act
adopted by a public authority (a Court, a specific Party Register office, a Tribunal), is
provided for by party regulation in 15 cases, which tend to coincide with those countries 
wherein party registration is compulsory: party dissolution implies its removal from the 
register. In general, the provisions on the cessation of party activities also discipline the 
procedures that govern a party's own decision to dissolve (after merger/reorganization). 
The case of Finland is particular in that parties are removed from the Register if they do not 
obtain parliamentary representation in two consecutive national elections; and in Romania,
party inactivity is considered a cause for dissolution. 
3.1.3. Party Funding
Direct public funding 
Direct public funding consists in state funds to support party operational activities and/or 
electoral reimbursements. In many cases, state support is assigned also to parliamentary
groups (in general in proportion to the votes won at the last parliamentary elections by
each party, as well as an equal quota to each group). While only Malta does not provide 
parties with direct state subventions (see Tab. 3), in 16 cases direct funds are earmarked
for specific objectives, like the reimbursement of electoral campaigning, public advertising,
the costs of ordinary party activities, and organizational expenses. As reported in the 2010 
OPPR study, the funding schemes adopted by Western European countries tend to be rather
homogeneous. Public grants are generally provided on the basis of parliamentary or
electoral criteria or, as in most cases, a mixed formula. 
Public funds are assigned on a purely parliamentary basis in proportion to the number of
seats won, usually in the last parliamentary elections, in Belgium (where parties also
benefit from a fixed sum for each vote obtained), Finland, the Netherlands, Spain, and the 
UK. Electoral criteria guarantee the allocation of direct funds also to those parties that have
failed to gain parliamentary representation, in the event they have passed a specific
electoral threshold (ex. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden); if they presented lists in a
certain number of electoral districts (Cyprus, Greece) or obtained a specified number of 
votes (Denmark). Mixed parliamentary-electoral formulas to access public funding are 
adopted in Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Poland, Portugal, and Slovakia (wherein parties obtain
contributions for votes, for their activity, and for seats – see Piccio 2012). 
The only unifying characteristic of almost all public funding schemes is their reliance on
party-oriented, rather than candidate-oriented norms. In this regard, the case of France is
quite peculiar, as public funds are granted to parties whose candidates secured at least 1% 
of the vote in at least 50 constituencies: in addition, a quota of the direct funds assigned to 
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Indirect public funding
The most diffuse forms of indirect funds consist in subsidies in kind, i.e. non-monetary 
services that states provide to parties (for electoral material, electoral officers, polling
station facilities) and/or governmental licenses, such as those for free broadcasting and 
media access (Bardi et al. 2010). Also certain types of earmarked funds are considered 
indirect funding to political parties: this is the case for money transfers to the affiliated
associations of parties or to reserve activities, such as party press. Public incentives are a 
third kind of funding and usually consist in norms on tax deductibility (for parties and for
donors), systems of tax exemptions, tax credit or tax check-off: in general, public
incentives are limited by the law.
All EU countries grant indirect public funding to political parties. In most cases it consists in
free broadcasting time during election campaigns and also tax benefits (especially tax 
deductions for donations). Other kinds of services provided by the public authority may 
consist in: the coverage of expenses for transportation to and from polling stations
(Sweden; Italy); the offer of free space for party posters during campaign periods 
(especially at the local level: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain); 
reduced postal rates (Belgium, Italy, Sweden, Spain, Ireland, UK); the free use of public
halls (Britain, France, Spain, Italy); reduced rates for the use of public places, public
advertisement, billboards (Italy); organizing lotteries (Italy, Sweden); and preferential 
treatment in terms of party premises (Italy, Romania, Sweden). An additional type of  
indirect party funding – adopted also by the EU (EC 2004/2003) – consists in public
financing of institutes affiliated with parties for goal-oriented purposes, such as research, 
training, youth (Germany; Austria; the Netherlands until 1999); or the funding of specific
activities that are generally aimed at reinforcing political participation (Austria, Poland,
Italy). Usually, however, these earmarked funds cannot be spent for electoral activities.
Private funding
Political parties are financed also through private funding, i.e. voluntary contributions such
as membership fees, fund-raising events, foreign donations, contributions of interested
money, returns on investments, small-private donations, profits on party-owned business 
(Bardi et al. 2010). Due to the original voluntary and private nature of political parties, 
states have tended to avoid the strict regulation of such resources: however, in so much as 
political parties have become “public entities”, specific limits have been progressively
introduced to regulate private funding. Partly different is the case of post-Communist 
countries, wherein the introduction of a detailed and comprehensive state regulation, also
in the sphere of private funding, was considered conducive to stabilizing the newly
established party systems and to prevent political corruption. Unsurprisingly, then, all of 
the Central and Eastern countries that were part of the ex-Soviet bloc have adopted 
regulations that set the limits on private funding: in absolute terms, only 5 Member States
(Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden) do not present such provisions. 
In most cases, such limits consist in ceilings or bans on private donations that come from 
natural and legal persons as well as corporations or semi-public organizations. Foreign and
often anonymous donations are banned (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain) or limited (Hungary,
Lithuania, UK). In Estonia, Luxembourg and Portugal the law prohibits donations from legal 
persons. In general, obligations for the public disclosure of a donor's identity, through the 
creation of specific registers, have been introduced (also in the Danish case).
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Limits to party expenditures have been instituted to avoid excessive disparity in the
political competition. Consolidated parties, with a well-established organizational profile, a
longstanding tradition within the representative institutions, and deep ties with civil society
are expected to be wealthier than “new comers”: this initial advantage could turn into self-
reinforcing tendencies that prevent the entrance and institutionalization of new political
actors. At the EU level, approximately half of the Member States have regulative profiles
that establish specific limits for party expenditures. Limits are often related to election
campaigns – although ceilings may be introduced also for the parties' ordinary activities – 
and are applicable to both parties and candidates. 
3.2. Party regulation and funding at EU level 
3.2.1. The shortcomings of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003
The introduction of State subventions and regulatory schemes of party activities and 
organizations is commonly cited as a factor that is conducive to party and party system 
institutionalization27, in particular in post-transitional countries. Of course, a number of
other preconditions occur to favour these intertwined processes28. However, we limit our
analysis here to the incidence of party regulation and funding regimes, which seem to be
the most relevant vectors for the institutionalization of Political Parties at European Level
(PPELs).
At the European level, parties are still in the very early stages of development29. Thus, the
introduction of a funding scheme, in 2003, was considered to be very important in the 
promotion of transnational convergence and hence transnational party and party system 
building (Bardi et al. 2010). The legal basis of the rules for funding PPELs is found in Article 
191 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and further regulations. In
particular, since Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 was adopted, PPELs have begun to receive 
both direct and indirect funding from the general EP budget. The regulation of party funding 
was partially amended in 2007 (Regulation No 1524). 
To be qualified as a “Political Party at European level” and, thus, to have the possibility to
apply for funding, a party must: 1) have legal personality in the Member State in which its 
seat is located; 2) be represented, in at least ¼ of the Member States, by Members of the 
EP (or in the national or regional Parliaments or regional assemblies); or it must have 
received (at least in ¼ of the Member States) at least 3% of the votes cast in each of those
Member States at the most recent EP elections; 3) observe, in its program and activities,
the founding principles of the EU (liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedom, the rule of law); 4) have participated in elections to the European
Parliament, or have expressed the intention to do so. 
The main purpose of the so-called Statute for European Political Parties was to improve the 
integration process at the political level, by favouring the consolidation of political actors
operating at the European level. However, as reported in the aforementioned study carried
out by the Observatory on Political Parties and Representation, the Statute presented a
number of structural shortcomings. 
First, the active role played by national parties in promoting the adoption of the Statute has 
been interpreted as part of a broader cartelization strategy to access public funding and its 
27 See  Koss 2011; Bardi et al. 2010; Booth, Robbins 2010; Pizzimenti, Bardi forthcoming. 

28 Casal Bértoa 2011.
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extension to the EU level. In fact, the Statute was little more than a series of norms 
created to regulate the public funding of PPELs.
Second, the generally positive picture provided by the Statute was counterbalanced by two 
provisions, one contained directly in the statute, and the other in its implementation rules,
which keep the PPELs in a subordinate position with respect to their national components 
and to the EP Party Groups. In fact, the latter have been put directly in charge of 
supervising the management of the funds for party financing. Furthermore, the provision of
the statute that conditions the allocation of public funds on 25 percent co-financing from 
other sources made national parties, above all the stronger and richer ones, decisive in 
constituting and maintaining PPELs. These resources can only be found at the national 
level, either directly through contributions from member parties – up to a ceiling of 40 per
cent of the total, and in any case more than the amount  needed for co-financing – or  
through the party’s contacts in society and in the economic sphere. 
However, the biggest shortcoming of the Statute was that it did not address the issue of 
how to effectively link PPELs, and through them the EU political system, to European 
citizens and their society, beyond the general statement that such linkage is the main
reason for their existence. In theory, this function is still performed exclusively through the 
national parties, who therefore remain the principal gatekeepers of EU level representation. 
The OPPR study concluded that demands from supranational party components to 
strengthen party organizations at the European level seem to have been conditionally
accepted by national parties, who in turn appear for the time being more interested in the 
organizational opportunities the Statute has afforded them than in the improvements it can 
produce for European democracy. 
3.2.2. The reform of the Statute: the Giannakou Report 
Over the past three years, an animated debate on the need to reform the regulation
governing PPELs and the rules regarding their funding has flourished, at least (and 
unsurprisingly) at the institutional level. In particular, the European Parliament has
requested that the Commission propose a new draft statute for PPELs, drawing on the 
strengths and the weakness of the existing set of norms and procedures regulating their 
functions and funding.
The “Report on the application of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003”30, adopted by the 
Committee on Constitutional Affairs on 15.03.2011 and better-known as the “Giannakou
Report”, represents the first comprehensive document to call for significant changes in the
overall architecture of PPEL regulation. In particular, the premise of the Report relies on the
recognition of the need for the link between PPELs and European citizens to be
strengthened, as a necessary pre-condition for the creation of an authentic European
(public) space and as a vector to promote a transnational party system. 
According to the 2007 amending Regulation, the Report confirms that the increased role of
PPELs within the institutional architecture of the EU necessitates their “organizational 
convergence” by establishing a new set of formal institutional regimes, i.e. “adopting a 
uniform and common European statute for all European political parties and their political 
foundations based on the law of the European Union” that defines a common political, legal 
30 See Committee on Constitutional Affairs (2011), Report on the application of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 on 
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and fiscal status. 
As mentioned above, the previous study conducted by the OPPR underlined that the
adopted Statute focused almost exclusively on the funding of PPELs: no clear distinction 
was drawn between the recognition and the funding of PPELs. Indeed, that specific formal
institutional regime did not favour the organizational institutionalization of PPELs nor their
supposed role in creating a European polis. They are still “merely umbrella organizations for 
national parties” (and their cartelization strategies) and they are perceived by citizens to be 
distant from their political reality. 
The normative view underlying the rationale of the Giannakou Report is in line with the 
modification of the nature and role of political parties, as described in Par. 2.2: “political  
parties have rights, obligations and responsibilities [and] should therefore follow converging
general organizational patterns”. This implies there ought to be the introduction of a more
defined set of norms and provisions, based directly on EU law, that go beyond those
expressed in the existing Statute. 
Thus, the new regulation has a twofold objective: on the one hand, it promotes party
organizational convergence and institutionalization; on the other, reference to the law of
the European Union is implicitly considered a necessary condition to pursue the European 
public interest, which seems to be identified with the legal framework of the EU. In both
cases, a top-down and institutionally-driven approach to the PPELs organizational-building,
functions and activities emerges. 
The Report indicates a list of guidelines to be followed by the Commission in formulating
the new draft that are to be integrated with the existing regulation. We group these general 
provisions and requirements into four categories: 1) legal; 2) organizational; 3) electoral;
and 4) financial.
Legal provisions for the recognition of PPELs are the criteria advanced by the rapporteur 
that entitle national or regional parties (only in the case of regional parliaments/assemblies
endowed with legislative powers) to institute a PPEL  Moreover, recognition is tied to the 
presence of at least one MEP – affiliated to a PPEL  – in the EP.
In organizational terms, the fundamental precondition is that parties must fully respect
internal democratic procedures with regard to the composition and the formation of party 
organs. In addition, to consolidate the relationship between citizens and PPEL 
organizations, the latter are requested to consider the possibility of direct individual
membership as well as the direct/indirect participation of individuals in intra-organizational
party life.
The Report confirms the strictly “European” vocation of PPELs: the electoral requirements 
dictate that they should be allowed to participate in national referenda “only on the issues 
that are strongly linked to the European Union”. In addition, the new Statute of the PPELs
might help the adoption of a transnational list of MEP's to be elected, as was already
suggested in the Duff report and supported by specialized studies. 
In line with the original imprinting of the Reg. 2004/2003, the reform of the financial
regime lies at the heart of the Report. The Commission is expected to introduce a new title 
in the Financial Regulation that is specifically dedicated to PPELs and foundations, as for the 
reason that the existing set of procedures for the award of funding and the closure of the
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work programmes as a precondition for funding or the availability of the 80% per cent of
funds at the beginning of the financial year). At the same time, the Report requests that
the Commission to provide a stricter framework of sanctions (financial penalties) to 
enhance the transparency of private fund-raising actions as well as to avoid infringements 
with regard to the use of public funds. The combination of private and public funding is
considered conducive to party organizational institutionalization.  The measure that would
raise the EUR 12,000 per year limit on donations to EUR 25,000 (per year, per donor) – 
which aims to favour stronger ties between PPELs and EU citizens and to guarantee the 
transparency of operations – is in accordance with most of the national laws on party 
funding of Member States. 
At the same time, to help new or smaller parties to institutionalize, the Regulation should
not prohibit (as it presently does) the parties from financing the entire operating 
expenditure of their beneficiary body and should reduce the amount of the independent 
resources they are requested to demonstrate to 10 per cent of their total budget.
3.2.3. The proposal of the Commission
During 2012, the European Commission conducted an in-depth analysis of the financing 
and regulatory scheme governing PPELs, following the adoption of the Giannakou Report.
In September 2012, a proposal “on the statute and funding of political parties and
European political foundations”31 was presented, drawing. It drew on the shared view that 
“European political parties and foundations have an important role to play to reinforce and
foster representative democracy at EU level, and bridge the divide between EU politics and 
the Union's citizens”32. 
The measures advanced by the Commission consist of two different proposals: the first is
intended to replace the Reg. (EC) 2004/2003, in order to increase the visibility, recognition, 
effectiveness, transparency and accountability of the PPELs (and foundations); the other
would amend the Financial Regulation. Henceforth we will discuss the first. This proposal  
was the result of a consultative process between the Commission and a number of 
institutional and non-institutional actors, among which the representatives of the PPELs.
Their contribution was particularly helpful in identifying the difficulties they encounter in
their day-by-day activities. 
In the following section we analyse the proposal of the Commission using the analytical 
framework we outlined in Section 2 to describe party regulation and funding regimes
adopted by the Member States. 
Party registration
The new definition of “European Political Party” introduces the concept of “registration”, i.e. 
the formal recognition of the party in accordance with the conditions and procedures set 
out by the Regulation. The registration is a fundamental requisite in order to be able to
apply for EU funding, as it implies the party in question respects the values upon which the 
EU is founded as well as “the commitment to and respect for high standards of internal 
party democracy”. 
Although it aims to define a common legal status for the PPELs, through the introduction of 
a European Registry, the proposal complies with the principle of proportionality: for matters
31 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the statute and funding of
 
European political parties and European political foundations. COM(2012) 499 final, 2012/0237 (COD). 
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that are not or only partly regulated by the new regulation, the European political parties
and foundations would continue to be governed by national laws (those of the Member  
States in which they have their respective seat). 
According to the Reg. 2004/2003, in order to be registered as a PPEL, a political alliance33 
must comply with a number of pre-conditions and requirements. The European legal 
statute establishes the possibility to register as a Political Party at European Level and
therefore to obtain a legal status based on EU law succeeding any pre-existing national 
legal personality. Moreover, the presence in the European Parliament of at least one 
member of the applying PPEL is a conditio sine qua non to register. An eligible party must
be represented, in at least ¼ of the Member States, by Members of the EP or in the 
national Parliaments or, regional Parliaments/Assemblies. It must have received, in at least 
¼ of the Member States, at least 3% of votes cast in each of those Member States at the
elections to the EP. Another criterion relates to the European political dimension: aspiring
parties must have participated in elections to the EP or have expressed the intention to
participate in the upcoming elections. In addition, parties must observe in their 
programme/activities the values upon which the EU is founded. 
Compliance with the conditions and requirements laid out in the regulation is verified 
annually by the EP. This may also occur when requested by ¼ of its EP members and when
at least three political groups are represented. The final decision, voted by a majority of the
members of the EP, in preceded by a hearing of the representatives of the PPEL concerned 
and by an opinion formulated by a committee of three independent personalities appointed,
respectively, by the EP, the Council and the Commission (art. 7.2). If any of the conditions/
and/or requirements are no longer satisfied, the PPEL shall forfeit or give up its legal status
and cease to have European legal personality. 
Party organization
To be recognized as a PPEL and thus enter be placed on the Register, a party must comply 
with a number of specific organizational requirements. The statutes of a PPEL shall regulate 
a minimum of administrative and legal provisions and administrative aspects. The most 
notable are the following: its legal seat (which must be located in one of the Member 
States) and the bodies/natural persons entitled to legally represent the party; the intra­
party distribution of competences among executive and representative organs; the rights
and duties of its members and an annexed list of members; the internal chain of
democratic delegation and the modalities of the decision-making processes, including the 
voting procedures; the administrative and financial profile of the party, with detailed
provisions on transparency, accountability and publicity.
Party programme
The application to register as a PPEL is to be accompanied by a list of specific documents,
among which the written political programme of the party.
Termination of party activities
The proposal advanced by the Commission regulates also the instances in which a PPEL 
forfeits or gives up its status and ceases to have European legal personality. This could 
happen after a party makes the decision to end its activity or decides to convert it into a 
legal entity recognized by the law of a Member State. Once the PPEL makes this decision, it
33 The definition of “political alliance” instituted by the new regulation (Art. 2) is the following: “a political alliance
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is removed from the Registry and loses its European legal status if it no longer meets the
requirements laid out in the Regulation.
Party direct funding
The European Parliament allocates direct funds to eligible PPELs. Each member of the 
European Parliament shall be considered as a member of only one PPEL, the one to which
his or her national or regional political party is affiliated. To avoid (at least apparently) the 
absolute dominance of public funds over other kinds of revenue, the financial contributions 
from the general budget of the European Union shall not exceed 90 per cent of the annual 
reimbursable expenditure of a PPEL:  however, this upper limit roughly covers 
approximately the entire budget of a PPEL. Contributions are distributed as follows: 15 per 
cent shall be distributed in equal shares, 85 per cent shall be distributed among the 
beneficiary parties in proportion to their respective share of elected and affiliated members
of the European Parliament. 
Party indirect funding
Given the existing funding schemes at the national level, the new separate Title in the 
Financial Regulation is expected be more flexible with respect to the working methods and 
activities of the PPELs, in that it should enable PPELs to build up their reserves using their
own resources and to generate their own funds by raising the level of donations permitted
per year and per donor. Many Member States grant beneficial tax treatment to both the 
beneficiary and the donor, when donations are made to domestic political parties. Given the 
need to encourage the autonomous development of a party’s own resources, a beneficial 
tax treatment is granted to PPELs (in accordance with the fiscal treatment applied in the 
Member State where in which the party has its legal seat) and their donors (in accordance
with the fiscal treatment applied in the Member State where in which the donor is resident
for tax purposes). 
Limits to private funding
The kinds of limits on private funding set out by Reg. 2004/2003 were considered a crucial 
shortcoming of the Regulation itself. The proposal of the Commission is intended to
improve party transparency, accountability and responsibility: thus certain types of
donations and contributions to PPELs are prohibited or subject to limitations and reinforced 
transparency requirements. The new Regulation, in particular, imposes obligations of public
disclosure of a donor's identity and delimits specific upper ceilings. PPELs may accept 
donations from natural or legal persons of up to a value of EUR 25,000 per year and per 
donor. The fees paid to PPEL members are not to exceed 40 per cent of the annual budget. 
Similar to most of the national restrictions, the specific limitations apply to: (a) anonymous 
donations or contributions, (b) donations from any undertaking over which the public
authorities “may exercise directly or indirectly a dominant influence by virtue of their
ownership of it, their financial participation therein, or the rules which govern it”; (c) 
donations from any public authority from a third country. In addition, (d) PPELs cannot 
accept donations from the budgets of political groups in the EP.
Limits to party expenditures
Limits to party expenditures are specifically introduced in order to prevent the
“nationalization” of the European contributions. PPELs are forbidden to finance, directly or 
indirectly, European or national political parties or candidates. Moreover, European political
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3.2.4. The final draft of the new regulation
In the early months of 2014 the EP and the Council of the European Union adopted the final 
draft of the new regulation on the statute and funding of PPELs and PFELs. The regulation
introduced significant changes, compared to the EC's proposal. In particular, the creation of 
an independent Authority, an ad hoc organ34 intended to supervise the registration, control 
and sanctions of PPELs and PFELs, also regarding their funding and expenditure. The
Authority is represented by a Director, appointed jointly by the EP, the Council and the EC 
(the three main actors in the decision-making process concerning the registration/de­
registration of the PPELs). Candidates to this post shall not be members of the EP nor of 
any national parliament, and shall not be current or former employees of a PPEL. The EP 
will host physically the Authority, providing it with offices and administrative support.
The Authority is in charge of establishing and managing the PPEL Register. Registration is 
compulsory for parties that want to obtain European legal status and be provided with legal
capacity and recognition in all the Member States in order to receive public funding. PPELs 
should respect the values on which the EU is founded. In case of manifest breach, PPELs 
can be made subject to a procedure of de-registration, which implies loss of European legal
status.  
The regulation gives PPELs strong incentives to acquire a European legal personality. The 
European character of PPELs is reinforced by the fact that the Authority, upon request from 
a Member State, is entitled to remove from the Register a party that has failed to respect
national legislation. In general, the whole regulation aims at harmonising cooperation
between EU institutions and the Member States’ authorities, to ensure effective and 
efficient control of obligations stemming from applicable European and national law. The 
conditions set for the registration of a PPEL are close to those described in the section
3.2.3. However, the registration is allowed also if: a) a PPEL is represented in at least ¼ of
the Member States by Members of the EP, of national Parliaments or of regional
Parliaments/Assemblies; b) its member parties have received, in at least ¼ of the Member 
States, at least 3% of votes in EP elections.
The regulation of party statutes is subject to the discipline of EU law and of the national law
of the country where a PPEL has established its seat. Minor changes are introduced on the 
governance of PPELs: their statutes shall specify, in detail, their administrative and financial
organization and procedures as well as the internal procedure regulating their voluntary 
dissolution. The Member State in which a PPEL is registered may impose additional 
requirements to its statute. The list of the member parties of a PPEL must be annexed to 
the statute, which shall regulate powers, responsibilities and composition of the governing 
bodies as well as all the criteria set for the appointment/dismissal of candidates to internal
posts. 
With regard to the funding of PPELs, the role of the EP – through the dedicated Authorising
Officer – is strengthened. While the award criteria and the distribution of direct funding 
remain the same, the new regulation lowers to 85% the upper limit of the annual 
reimbursable expenditure covered by the contributions of the EU, which are ear-marked to
specific goals (administrative costs, technical assistance, meetings etc.). The new 
regulation focuses in particular on private funding. It specifies more in detail the meaning
of “donation” (up to a value of EUR 18 000 per year per donor, a figure lower than in the 
past), the discipline set for the contributions from members, and modifies the regime of
34 The Authority is a body of the Union within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU. The Authority is assisted by a
Committee of independent eminent persons for decisions related to respect, by PPELs, for the values on which the





























                                                 




Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
public disclosure of donors35. In general, the overall regime of private funding looks more
restrictive, whereas the prohibition of funding of national parties or candidates is explicitly
reinforced. 
3.3. Conclusions 
The introduction of public funding schemes and regulation of political parties in Europe has 
been considered useful means to favour party and party system institutionalization. The 
formal recognition of the role of political parties as producers of public goods has 
progressively modified the original private nature of their organizations, by turning them
into a unique form of public utilities: as parties are granted access to (either direct and/or 
indirect) public funding, they are subject to laws and regulation by the state. 
National funding schemes and regulations have represented the main reference point for
the EP and the EC in their efforts to reinforce the nature and role of PPELs and to create a 
transnational party system at EU level. In this sense, the “iron law of Europeanization”
based on the (supposedly one-way) normative pressures issued from Brussels does not 
seem to be confirmed. On the contrary, given the existing national practices – in particular 
those of the most recently democratized Member States – EU institutions have
progressively opted for a more detailed and defined codification of the nature, role and
activities of PPELs.
Regulation 2004/2003 has been considered likely to be very important to improve the 
integration process on the political side, by promoting the organizational convergence and 
hence the development of transnational parties and party system building. However, this
Regulation was little more than a series of norms to regulate PPEL funding and its greatest
shortcoming lays in the fact that it did not address the issue of how to effectively link PPELs 
(and the EU political system) to European citizens. It comes as no surprise that ten years
after the adoption of Reg. 2004/2003, PPELs are still in a very early stage of organizational 
development and a truly European transnational party system is far from being 
institutionalized.
The main objective of the Giannakou Report adopted by the AFCO in 2011 was to move 
forward the process of political transnationalization at the EU level, through the
introduction of a more defined set of norms and provisions the aim of which is to favour the
organizational convergence of PPELs. The adoption of a common European legal personality 
and of a uniform European statute for all European political parties, based on EU law that 
defines a shared legal, organizational and financial status is a fundamental precondition for
the creation of a European polis and a common political space. From this perspective, the 
PPELs shall respect a common set of principles, democratic rules, and organizational 
requisites to obtain European legal status through the registration in the European 
Register. 
The final regulation, based on the Giannakou Report and revised by the EC, was adopted by 
the EP and the Council. It focuses on the centrality of the European legal status and the 
European legal personality, which are considered key pre-conditions to enhance the 
European character of PPELs. However, compared to the Giannakou report, the new 
regulation seems less keen to promote an effective autonomization of PPELs. Also the 
To balance the right to the protection of the personal data, on the one hand, and the public transparency
of the funding scheme, on the other, the obligation to publish the identity of natural persons should not apply to
donations equal or below 1 500 EUR per year and per donor, as well as for donations between 1 500 and 3 000
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funding regime imposes stricter limits, in particular on private funding. 
Although the adoption of regulatory frameworks and funding schemes, per se, does not 
represent a guarantee for the creation and stabilization of party organizations and party 
systems, national experiences have shown that the introduction of such institutional
regimes may help the process. In general the creation of a transnational party system at 
EU level can be favoured by the new regulation. However PPEL funding will continue to
come from the EP budget whereas a solution that would make the PPELs less dependent on
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4. POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS AT EUROPEAN LEVEL 
KEY FINDINGS
 
 PFELs could potentially play a role in strengthening the policy-seeking capacities of 
PPELs, thus contributing to the development of a transnational party system.
 The degree of closeness between PFELs and PPELs varies. 
 Although they operate in the same legal and institutional environment, different
PFELs have set different goals and priorities for themselves. 
 Most activities of PFELs can be classified under the production of publications and
the organization of events. 
 The amount of activities carried out by the PFELs is directly related to the size of the 
PFEL and their relative access to financial resources. 
A Political Foundation at European level (PFEL) is defined in the consolidated version of
Regulation 2004/2003 as “an entity or network of entities which has legal personality in a 
Member State, is affiliated with a political party at European level, and which through its 
activities, within the aims and fundamental values pursued by the European Union, 
underpins and complements the objectives of the political party at European level”. Today
there are 13 PFELs that represent various political traditions, opinions on European
integration, and priorities and strategies for action.36 This report aims to interpret and 
assess their development. 
Although the literature devoted to PFELs is still in progress, two differing approaches have 
already emerged. Dakowska (2009) primarily sees PFELs as “a means to attain legitimacy
and access to EU institutions”, or as a part of European civil society. Gagatek and Van 
Hecke (2011; 2013; 2014), on the other hand, emphasize the role of PFELs in
complementing the activities of political parties at European level (PPELs). Given that this 
report is concerned with the prospects for the development of a transnational party system, 
our primary focus is to present the relationship between PFELs and PPELs. Indeed, the
raison d’être of the PFELs is to complement and enrich the work of PPELs, and by surveying 
the activities of PFELs, this chapter will address the question as to how precisely this is
carried out. 
Gagatek and Van Hecke (2011) provide several ideas as to why the nature and shape of
the connection between PPELs and PFELs could potentially be important for the 
development of a transnational party system. As we discussed in Bardi et al. (2010), a 
functioning party system requires a set of structured relationships between the parties that 
is based on competition for political office. Leaving aside for the moment the question of 
political office and the means of political competition, political parties must develop a
programmatic basis upon which to fuel such competition. Prior to the establishment of 
PFELs, and in sharp contrast with the political groups in the European Parliament,
Europarties lacked the personal and material resources to closely follow the short-term and 
medium-term EU policy process (Van Hecke 2010). As Gagatek and Van Hecke (2011) 
argue, the establishment of PFEL provided Europarties with an opportunity to fill this gap, 
to acquire  a source of new ideas, to become more policy-oriented, or – how it is usually
36 The most recent data concerning the list of PFELs, their affiliation to PPELs and the amount of subsidies they 
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referred to in the literature – to focus on policy-seeking goals (Strom 1990). Yet, even if we
leave this policy-seeking perspective to focus on the role of PFELs in building a European 
public sphere (Dakowska 2011), the idea, from the beginning, amongst policy-makers was 
that PFELs should help build a politicized public sphere, based on different political views 
presented by different political parties. In the words of Margot Wallström, who as 
Commissioner for Inter-institutional Relations and Communication Strategy piloted the
legislative proposal that aimed to create PFELs, “the activities of European political parties,
together with the creation of PFELs, is part and parcel of building this real European public
sphere, where different opinions can challenge each other and the citizens can better
understand the challenges at stake and make informed choices” (European Parliament 
2007). 
However, what PFELs theoretically can do and what they do in practice is quite different. 
For this reason, we believe that knowledge regarding PFELs must be enriched by as much 
empirical evidence as possible, and this is why we will concentrate here on the actual work 
of PFELs, limiting ourselves to discuss only essential elements in other areas. In completing 
this part of the report, we have used three primary sources: the academic literature, the 
results of a conference jointly organized by OPPR and AFCO in February 2013 (henceforth 
“Conference 2013”) – which brought together the representatives of a large majority of 
PFELs – the official websites of the PEFLs and the survey we distributed to PFELs in January 
2014 (henceforth “Survey 2014”).37 
4.1. Organization and funding
Who controls the activities, organization and funding of PFELs? This question seems to be
crucial for gaining a better understanding of the overall role of PFELs. In order to address 
this issue, legal status and the internal decision-making system within PFELs must be 
briefly examined. Subsequently, we will discuss the question of membership and funding. 
4.1.1. Allocation of authority 
From a formal perspective, the allocation of authority must be sought out in the relevant
legislation that governs the activities of the PFELs. On the one hand, the amended
Regulation 2004/2003 provides a set of general rules concerning the aims, organization, 
and funding of PFELs, whereas the national legislation of the country in which a PFEL has its 
seat as a legal person supplies specific rules regarding how it should be governed and 
financed. At the moment of writing, there are 13 PFELs, four of which are based outside
Belgium. This means that the majority of PFELs are constituted as International Non Profit
Associations (AISBL) and based in Belgian law. Although the Belgian legislation provides
some rules about what organs must be created, no uniform requirements as to how  
precisely these bodies should operate are specified.
Consequently, we must review more practical arrangements. Gagatek and Van Hecke 
(2013, 2014) argue that despite the fact that they operate in the same legal environment, 
the PFELs have placed their respective centres of power differently, at least from the point
37 Of the 12 PFELs to which we sent our survey, we received responses from all but three: the European
Foundation for Freedom (funded by the EP since 2011, and affiliated to the European Alliance for Freedom), the
Organization for European Interstate Cooperation (funded by the EP since 2011, and affiliated to the EU
Democrats) and the Foundation for a Europe of Liberties and Democracies (funded by the EP since 2012 and 
affiliated to the Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy). We did not send our survey to the newest
PFEL Identités Traditions Européennes (funded by the EP since 2013 and affiliated to European Alliance of National
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of view of the content of their statutes. Overall, two general models (with one exception)
can be identified. In the case of the two largest foundations, CES and FEPS, the influence of 
the respective PPEL and national political foundations is roughly the same, wherein the 
PPELs have, perhaps, a slight advantage. This can be clearly observed by analysing the 
composition and voting rights within the internal organs of PFELs. For example, in the 
Bureau of FEPS, which is composed of 20 members, six represent national political 
foundations and think tanks, whereas seven are ex-officio members that represent the PES, 
its political group in the EP. A similar system has been established for the General
Assembly. Gagatek and Van Hecke provide evidence that this was a conscious choice on 
the part of the PES, which wanted to ensure that the FEPS agenda would be 
complementary to that of the PES. On the other hand, FEPS itself emphasizes that it is 
“close but independent” from the PES. A comparable arrangement is visible in the CES; the 
important difference is that until very recently the EPP President, the late Wilfred Martens,
was also the President of CES, and EPP Secretary General Antonio Lopez Isturiz was (and
still is) the Treasurer of CES.
However, another model, typical of most other foundations, exists in which the influence of
the partisan element is much less visible (Gagatek and Van Hecke 2014), although 
nonetheless present. For example, one of the ELF Vice-Presidents is the ex officio President
of ALDE. An interesting case regards Transform Europe! This last was established in 2001, 
prior to the adoption of the legal framework of PFELs, and only in 2006 was it recognized
by the Party of the European Left (PEL) as its official political foundation. Their statutes are 
silent regarding the PEL, and the representatives of this last are invited to the General
Assembly of Transform Europe! only as guests (Gagatek and Van Hecke 2013). 
The only exception to the general trends described above concerns the Institute of
European Democrats (IED) – affiliated to the European Democratic Party – which seems to 
be the most politically oriented PFEL. The IED places itself directly in the centre of political
fights. Its leaders argue that IED’s business is politics, not research at the service of MEPs
affiliated to the EDP.
4.1.2. Membership 
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that PFELs aim to create and then coordinate a network 
of partners from several EU Member States. However, it is less obvious whom they ought 
to accept as members. From this point of view, they face a two-pronged dilemma. First,
should they only accept national political foundations and think tanks with clear links to 
their respective national political parties, or they should be more flexible? The first model is
characteristic for the largest PFEL, namely the Centre for European Studies (CES), which is 
affiliated to the European People’s Party (EPP). CES has 26 national member foundations,
all of which must have obtained official recognition from one of the EPP member parties.
However, although the EPP has 50 member parties in the EU, not all of them have their 
own official political foundations, thus explaining why CES has only 26 members. The 
majority of the other foundations are more flexible and allow for the membership of
anybody who is ideologically or politically close to them, without the need to have 
connections to national political parties. In some cases, this ideological proximity is
measured by the future’s member’s acceptance of a basic programmatic document of the 
affiliated PPEL. For example, this is the case with ELF and the European Christian Political
Foundation (see Gagatek and Van Hecke 2013). 
The second dilemma concerns whether this network should be composed only of national 
political foundations and think tanks or also of national political parties. In this case, there 



















































































Political P arties and Poli tical Foundati ons at European Level. Ch allenges and Opportunities
The most important entity with which a PFEL cooperates and has re lations is clearly the
affiliat ed political party at E uropean level, as the organizational ties interconnecting the two
EU lev el actors so clearly demonstrate. The affili ated party, however, is not the only entity
with w hich they cooperate and have r elations. A political foundation al so has relations with
other actors including for e xample the other PFELs, nation al foundations, think tanks, and
NGOs. These relations, inclu ding the potential int eractions, are described in section 2.
To conclude, even if the PFE Ls had already come into being prior to th e European elections
of 2009, they were still in t oo early a stage of d evelopmen t to help the affiliated PPELs in
drafting their policy progra ms and the elector al platforms. Several developments with
regard to the upcoming 2014 elections are worth mentioning. Some relevant news can be
underlined for the upcoming 2014 elections. These elements will be analysed in s ection 3. 
4.2.1. Outcomes
All the representatives of foundations confirm that the th emes deal t with by PFELs are
coherent with th e targets explicitly identified in the a mended Regulation 2 004/2003,
meaning they contribute to the creatio n of a European Politi cal Space and to the integration
of European and national spheres. Other speakers (such as the regionalist CMC) preferred
to emphasize their role in giving a broader au dience to national a nd local e vents and
interes ts (Conference 2013).
In 2013, representatives of foundation s declared that most of the activities implemented
by the PFELs consist in the organization of confe rences, seminars, youth and ot her annual
events, and sum mer schools. Graph 1 display s the more precise ranking by level of
importance that the foundati ons assign ed to seve ral activitie s in 2014 (Survey 2014). 
Figure 4.2: Opin ions rega rding the most effe ctive acti vities performed by PFEL to 
promo te the European a wareness of citizens througho ut Europe
Key: (scale from 1-7, where 1 is th e ‘least effect ive’ and 7 ‘m ost effective’)
Source: Survey 2014
All the functions carried out by the foundations received positive comments by the PFEL
representatives, insofar as all the marks were over 4. Of th e eight foundations that replied
to this questionnaire, five c onsider the organizati on of conferences and seminars to be the
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To conclude, our research demonstrates that three foundations do not carry out visible
activities, or public events and publications. We cannot be certain whether they are really 
active or not, however we can assume that the impact of OEIC,  FELD and  EFF is very  
limited. The representatives of these foundations also did not participate in the conference 
organized by OPPR in February 2013 the aim of which was to assess the role of PFELs five 
years after their establishment.
With regard to the others, during the conference in 2013 they clearly articulated their
ability to perform, albeit in some cases with the limits imposed by their size and 
organizational resources, their more political function, that is to help develop a European
consciousness amongst the potential voters of their affiliated parties. However, at least one
speaker remarked that it remains very difficult for the PFELs to reach people who are not 
already interested in the EU and related issues. What is even more problematic, however,
is the difficulty with which the PFELs perform their more “cultural” functions, i.e. to spread
the idea of Europe amongst the citizens at large, irrespective of their party preferences
(Congress 2013). 
4.2.2. Relations with the PPELs and with other PFELs40 
Most PFELs also seem to be very respectful of the prescriptions laid out in the Regulation
regarding organization. Many speakers emphasized the importance of relations and 
coordination with the respective affiliated PPELs. In some cases this may lead to the 
organization of coordinated annual events or to outright proposals of ideas and policy
choices at the respective Europarties Leaders’ Summits (FEPS and CES). In fact, CES and 
FEPS seem to be the two foundations that have the strongest relations with their affiliated 
PPELs. Both CES and FEPS advisors regularly meet with their respective counterparts in the
affiliated PPELs in order to inform one another about their current activities and plans. This
behaviour is not carried out to the same extent by the other two big foundations already
analysed in the literature – ELF and GEF – which tend to be more interested in direct 
contact with individual voters and sympathizers and/or to behave as a laboratory for new 
ideas (Gagatek, Van Hecke 2014). 
In particular, 7 out 9 foundations declared that they had relations with their affiliated 
PPELs, often or very often. Only two, New Direction and Green European Foundation 
declared not to have strong or decisive relations with their parties. In practice, as is shown 
in Graph 2, the field in which PFELs mostly cooperate with their affiliated PPEL regards 
drafting the electoral manifesto and the development of the political strategy41. Also with 
regard to foundation-party relations, it is confirmed that training political personnel is not
considered a relevant activity for the foundations. 
40 Before the official introduction of the juridical figure of Political Foundation at the European Level by the EP in
2007, another actor, performing similar activities, already existed in the European Union. The “European Network
of Political Foundations – independent actors in democracy promotion, development cooperation and political 
dialogue” (ENOP) was founded in 2006 and also receives funds from the European Union. It had, and still has, the 
scope of serving “as a cooperation structure, and as a communication and dialogue instrument between European
political foundations and the Institutions of the European Union”. Differently from PFELs it is not linked to any
specific political party. 
















































































Political P arties and Poli tical Foundati ons at European Level. Ch allenges and Opportunities
Figure 4.3: Shar ed activit ies between PFELs and PPELs
Source: Survey 2014
Less conventionally, some PFELs do not limit thei r activities to the European Union, but also
have relations with organiz ations from extra-EU countries. In general, however, from an
organizational point of vie w, the PFE Ls function as networks (or, in the word s of some
speakers, “umbrellas”) of na tional foun dations.
All of the represe ntatives d escribed th e PFELs a s one of fo ur pillars of partisan activity at
the European level, the other three being the Member Organizations (th e national
foundations), the EP party g roups together with t he respecti ve PPELs, and the In ternational
Party Families or other inte rnational organizations (i.e. European or World Soc ial Forum)
(Conference 2013).
Differe nces amongst PFELs however emerged when the speaker s reported on their
respective capacities and on the strategies they adopted i n order to perform their tasks.
The most visible difference s appear to be dete rmined by the respective size of PFELs.
Smaller foundations prefe  to take a decentralized an d subsidia ry approach, made
necessary for some of them by the fa ct that th ey do not have central offices in Brussels
(ECPF is based in the Netherlands, EFF in Malta , and OEIC in Swede n). On the contrary,
CES an d FEPS stated that t hey had a more centralized top -down approach, at least in the
organization of the most i mportant activities a nd events. Inputs from national member
foundations are however relevant for the larger foundations as well. Th is differen ce, as may
be expected, is determined by the avai lability of esources: the two largest PFELs receive in
excess of twenty times the amount of EU funds given to the smalle st. This na turally has
profound implicat ions on how well an d effectiv ely the different PFELs can per form. Two
important points emerged regarding the effective links bet ween PFELs and civil societies in
member countries. From an organizational point of view, it also emerged that the larger
PFELs have an advantage which is du e not only to the siz e of their permanent staff, but
also to the connections they have in al l the member countries, connections that t he smaller
foundations do not have. Th ese links can be provided by the national foundations that are
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4.2.3. Special Activities for European Elections 
The 2009 elections to the European Parliament were held too close to the establishment of 
most of the foundations (2007) to allow for them to have a proactive role in drafting the 
electoral manifestoes of the PPELs. The literature notes that only the CES actually 
contributed to the electoral manifesto of the EPP (Gagatek, Van Hecke 2014).  
In view of the upcoming European elections of 2014, some PFELs have already organized
special events aimed to form electoral volunteers or potential candidates. This is the case
with the European Liberal Forum, which organized ahead of the upcoming EP elections in
2014 a pan-European event to discuss the main policy issues facing liberal youth 
organizations. In addition, “several experts presented best practices and lessons learnt 
from past European election campaigns, the use of New Media as a communication tool, a
self-defence course workshop on how to promote European liberal values in the face of
challenges by populist politicians as well as how to engage activists in political activities”
(ELF website). ELF has also organized two other specific training events for liberals of 
Central Europe and the Baltics and for those of Southeast Europe and the Western Balkans. 
However, all of the foundations declared that, in view of the upcoming European elections,
they have not increased the level of cooperation with their affiliated PPEL. Despite this,
several PFELs affirm that they are playing an important role in drafting the electoral
manifesto of their respective PPEL. This is clearly the case with the bigger foundations, CES 
and FEPS. The progressive foundation declares: “FEPS has been the one to initiate the 
intellectual debate on priorities and is involved with the progressive parties, foundations, 
NGOs etc. in the initial conversation about the priorities regarding the vision for Europe. 
From the point that the drafting and amending process started, FEPS moved to a 
consultant-like position, refraining itself from forging political deals regarding one or
another amendment. It keeps participating fully in the debate in all the respective PES 
bodies, and also in the drafting committees etc.” 
Of the smaller foundations, only three have declared that they have roles in drafting the 
electoral manifestos, namely, Transform (“somewhat”), GEF (“individual members of the 
Board in a consultative role, but not as a structural involvement of the foundation”) and
IED. In particular, IED seems to be one of the PFELs with the closest connections with its 
Europarty: “IED delegates take part in the EDP meetings (i.e. Council), in which they
always have an intervention scheduled in the agenda. During the intervention, the CEO 
reports on IED activities, launches new projects and shares the foundation's position on
subjects considered of particular importance (i.e. advising to include particular elements in
the manifesto)”.
4.3. Conclusions 
Before the establishment of political foundations at European level Europarties lacked the
personal and material resources to closely follow medium- and long-term EU policy process.
The establishment of PFELs provided Europarties with a means to help fill this gap. 
Moreover PFELs are for the respective Europarties sources of new ideas that, allow them to
become more policy-oriented and to focus on policy-seeking goals. Clearly, the two actors
with which the PFELs have stronger links are the Political Parties at European level and the 
national foundations, which in many cases represent the membership of PFELs. The 
activities of the PFELs are aimed at underpinning the already existing activities of the PPELs 
- as expressed by Regulation EC 1524/2007 and to give a broad audience, or provide a
common policy framework, to activities carried out by national foundations. These activities 
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EU, particularly among members of the affiliated national foundations and parties. Some 
“special” activities or stronger relations between PFELs could be expected in the occasion of
European elections, but evidence says that they have not increased their level of
cooperation and limit its help to partly participating the drafting of the Europarty’s electoral
platform. 
We have found a clear distinction between bigger and smaller foundations. This is not only
characterized by the difference in the amount of activities and publications the bigger 
foundations are capable of carrying out in comparison with the smaller ones (such a
distinction would be also obvious and acceptable) but also in the nature of the relations 
they have with their correspondent political party at European level. CES and FEPS have 
stronger connections with EPP and PES respectively than any other foundation has with its 
affiliated party. These stronger relations can be seen from a static perspective, but also 
from a dynamic one. From a static point of view we can see that individual members of the 
foundations are at times also de jure members of bodies of the party, or, as in the case of
FEPS, national political parties are members of the PES but also of the FEPS as well. From a
dynamic point of view we can see that these two PFELs often organize activities with their
PPEL, especially with regard to the crucial aspect of drafting the electoral platform for the 
European elections. The smaller PFELs have weaker relations with their PPELs, from the 
point of view of a shared membership between the two and, with the exception of the IED, 
from the point of view of common activities. However it is important to underline that the 
difference in resources, organization and, consequently, in the outcome of activities is
somewhat relevant amongst smaller foundations. In fact, with regard to some PFELs it has 
even proved impossible to collect data through our survey, insofar as we did not receive 
any answers from them, and from official sources – as aforementioned, some foundations
do not possess even a website. To conclude, we can  also remark that other ways of  
assessing the foundations are also necessary, but we limited our study to the examination 

































   
 
    
  
Political Parties and Political Foundations at European Level. Challenges and Opportunities 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 To a large extent this report confirms the findings of the 2010 report on “How to 
create a transnational party system”. 
 Our analysis does not reveal the emergence of territorial divides within the Party
Groups, particularly between their Northern and Southern members. 
 The introduction of a uniform and common European statute for all PPELs, based on
EU law, is a fundamental precondition for the creation of full-fledged parties at the 
European level as well as a transnational party system. 
 PFELs have strong links with the national political foundations and with the PPELs to
which they are affiliated. 
 Whilst the institutionalization of Europarties has continued, this trend does is 
insufficient for an improvement of the structure of the developing transnational
party system. 
 The decision on the part of the Europarties to enter the 2014 EP elections with their
own candidates for the Commission presidency would not be enough to create a 
fully-fledged transnational party system, but could be a step in the right direction.
KEY FINDINGS
 
The 2010 report on “How to create a transnational party system” found that whereas the
units of the system, the parties, were becoming more and more institutionalized, the 
development of competitive systems of interactions in the various supranational arenas
that are relevant for the creation of a party system at the European level was still lagging 
behind.
To a large extent this report confirms those findings. Our analysis on the positions and the 
cohesion of the EP Party Groups on key economic issues does not reveal the emergence of
territorial divides within the Party Groups, particularly between their Northern and Southern 
members, contrary to fears that geographical differences in macro-economic and financial 
perspectives would be mirrored within the Party Groups. Three different data-sets indicated 
that attitudinal and behavioural differences between the Northern and the Southern
members of the EP Party Groups remain small and have not grown after the economic crisis 
that has affected EU Member States for the last five years. Although the nature of the 
available data suggests that some caution should be used in the interpretation of our
findings, they provide positive indications concerning the development of transnational EP
Party Groups.
EP Party Groups are but one organizational component of the would-be transnational
parties. The 2010 report suggested that a better integration was needed with the other two 
components, the PPELs themselves and the national parties they include in their
membership. It also emphasized that the introduction of legislation at the EU level for the 
regulation and public funding of political parties was to be considered a useful means with 
which to favour party and party system institutionalization. Indeed, the introduction of a 
funding scheme, through Regulation 2004/2003 was found to promote the organizational
integration of transnational parties. Since then, the EP, and in particular the AFCO, have
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discussed and is scheduled for approval by the Council. The new scheme, outlined on the 
basis of the Giannakou Report, is meant to give further impulse to the process of party
transnationalization at the EU level. We feel that the proposal's approval, by introducing a
uniform and common European statute for all PPELs, based on EU law that defines a 
common legal, organizational and financial status is a fundamental precondition for the 
creation of full-fledged parties at the European level as well as a transnational party
system. In particular, the Commission's proposal is meant to strengthen the role of the 
PPELs in contributing to the dissemination of information to the public in order to raise
awareness of significant European policy matters. 
For this purpose, Political Foundations at European level were also established. It was felt
that Europarties lacked the necessary personnel and material resources needed to maintain
the links that are essential to communicate with citizens on policy options at both the
national and European level. The EU Regulation that established the PFELs is clear with 
regard to what their tasks should be. The primary tasks of the PFELs must aim to underpin 
the already existing activities of PPELs and to give a broader audience, as well as to provide 
a common policy framework, to activities carried out by national foundations. Our survey of 
the activities of PFELs indicated that they are indeed shaped by the goals laid out in the 
Regulation.  PFEL representatives reported that the actors with which they have the 
strongest links are the national political foundations and the PPELs to which they are 
affiliated. It should be noted, however, that contrary to what might be expected, or even 
feared, no intensification of the relations between PFELs and the PPELs to which they were
affiliated was verified in the period just prior to and during the European elections with the
exception of a few PFELs that helped their respective PPELs to draft their electoral 
platforms. 
As could be expected, the PFELs that are larger and have more financial resources are 
much more active than the comparatively smaller PFELs. Interestingly, however, 
differences between these two groups go beyond the material capacity to conduct
activities, and they extend to the nature of the relations they have with their respective
PPELs. CES and FEPS – the two largest PFELs – appear to have stronger connections with 
the EPP and with the PES respectively than the other foundations have with their affiliated 
PPELs in terms of overlapping memberships (meaning, the same national political parties 
are members of the larger PFELs and of their corresponding PPELs), as well as in terms of 
the quantity and quality (such as drafting the electoral platform for the European elections)
of shared activities. Naturally the larger PPELs are those that have a longer history and 
higher degree of institutionalization. As such, they have experienced higher levels of 
engagement in the activities that are typical of PFELs since before these last were created.
This has no doubt facilitated the development of intense relationships between the two. 
Overall, in the four years that have passed since our initial report on “how to create a
transnational party system” only partial progress has been made in the direction of the goal 
implicitly set by the report's title. As we indicated then, improvements were needed in both
elements of the party system: its units (the Europarties) and its structure (the sets of 
competitive interactions among the Europarties in various EU arenas). The 
institutionalization of Europarties has continued to develop, especially in terms of the
cohesiveness and inclusiveness of their EP components, the Party Groups, and potentially in
terms of the better integration of the three organizational faces of the Europarties. The
former development is particularly significant if we consider that the sustained economic 
crisis that has affected EU Member States throughout this period was feared to have the
potential to produce a very destructive effect on the internal structure of the Party Groups. 
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years. For the time being, the legislative improvements announced by the Commission's
proposal on the reform of party regulation and funding at the EU level, and the functions 
already being performed by the recently created PFELs are prospectively very significant. 
The elements we have examined in our report do not have per se the potential to improve 
the structure of the developing transnational party system. As is well known, substantial 
Treaty reforms, capable of establishing a more direct link between EU citizens and EU
executive institutions than the one provided by the intergovernmental links in the
Council(s) would be needed. Other than Treaty reform, there is only one potentially positive 
change that could occur as a result of a development that is beyond the remit of our 
investigation, namely, the decision on the part of the Europarties to enter the 2014 EP 
elections with their own candidates for the Commission presidency. Five PPELs have done 
so under the assumption that, once the EP election results are known, the proposed 
candidate that is the most successful will be nominated President of the Commission by the 
governments of the Member States. The elections would thus confer an indirect mandate 
on the new President of the Commission, boosting the democratic legitimacy of the EU 
system as a whole. Moreover, it would make the EP electoral arena more competitive, in
other words more “politicized”. To be sure, this innovation alone would not be enough to 
create a fully-fledged transnational party system, but, given the present institutional 
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6. REPORT’S SUMMARY
6.1. Introduction 
This report is based on a follow-up study on “How to create a transnational party system”.
It focuses: (a) the policy positions and coherence of the EP Party Groups after the Euro-
crisis; (b) the regulation and funding of political parties at European level (PPELs); (c) the 
role of political foundations at European level (PFELs).
It ascertains the continued ability of EP Party Groups to respond cohesively to the
challenges posed by the current economic crisis. 
It further assesses the opportunities and incentives provided by EU legislation on political
parties at the EU level for the development of a transnational party system.
Finally, it provides an assessment of the institutionalization of PFELs as organizations 
created for the promotion of democracy at EU level and for the support of their related
PPELs. 
6.2.	 Policy positions coherence of EP party groups after the euro-
crisis 
With regard to EU democracy, homogeneous political groups are crucial in providing
European voters with a meaningful programmatic supply. 
Despite the fact that the impact of the 2007 ‘mega-enlargement’ has been limited, the 
recent economic crisis may have endangered cohesion and the policy agenda of the Political
Groups, resulting in a new territorial divide between Northern and Southern MEPs. 
However, the analysis of the preferences of both the ‘party in the electorate’ and the ‘party
in public office’ unexpectedly revealed that differences between the Northern and the
Southern members of the EP Party Groups remain small and have not grown after the 
crisis.
Similarly, a territorial split within the Party Groups was not observed in the analysis of MEP
voting behaviour, leading to optimistic conclusions about the EU party system’s political 
development in spite of the economic crisis
6.3.	 The Regulation and funding of political parties at European 
level 
Party rules and regulations have a tendency to promote organizational convergence: this is 
particularly valid for non-stabilized party systems, such as the EU, where non-
institutionalized party organizations exist
EU institutions have progressively opted for a more detailed and defined codification of the 
























Political Parties and Political Foundations at European Level. Challenges and Opportunities 
The adoption of a common European statute for all PPELs, based on EU law and defining a 
common legal, organizational and financial status is a fundamental precondition for the 
creation of a European polis and a common political space.
The Giannakou Report and the Commission's proposal represent institutional efforts to
strengthen the transnational nature of the PPELs and to create deeper ties between them 
and EU citizens. 
6.4. Political foundations at the EU level 
PFELs could potentially play a role in strengthening the policy-seeking capacities of PPELs,
thus contributing to the development of a transnational party system.
The degree of closeness between PFELs and PPELs varies. 
Although they operate in the same legal and institutional environment, different PFELs have
set different goals and priorities for themselves. 
Most activities of PFELs can be classified under the production of publications and the 
organization of events. 
The amount of activities carried out by the PFELs is directly related to the size of the PFEL 
and their relative access to financial resources. 
6.5. Conclusions 
To a large extent this report confirms the findings of the 2010 report on “How to create a
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